Nahayo v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2026 FC 1173: Another Signal on Membership Under s. 34(1)(f)

Please note: This article is for general information and education only. It is not legal advice, and reading it does not create a solicitor-client relationship with Esna Law PC. Immigration law changes often and every case depends on its own facts. Speak with a licensed lawyer about your situation.
Over the past two years, our firm has been assisting former Iranian conscripts who were assigned to serve in the IRGC and who are now battling inadmissibility under section 34(1)(f), based on allegations that their conscription made them members of the IRGC. We’ve been representing over 50 of these individuals, and these are truly heartbreaking cases. I have been meaning to do a deep dive on the law (section 34(1)(f)), what it is doing to ordinary people, and the unfairness I see in how they are being pursued.
But when I finally sat down to write this week, a Federal Court decision came out that I think is important enough to address first: Nahayo v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2026 FC 1173. The full IRGC piece is coming in a future post.
The case, and why it matters for IRGC conscripts
Nahayo isn’t the first case to apply Mason to s. 34(1)(f). Nor does it carry as much weight as the Federal Court of Appeal decisions (Wahab and Weldemariam) that already confirmed Mason extends beyond s. 34(1)(e). But there are significant parallels between the facts in Nahayo and the cases of IRGC conscripts.
Mr. Nahayo was an active member of the Burundian army. The army had engaged in subversion by force against the government of Burundi on several occasions, including the coups d’état of 1993 and 1996, which brought it within s. 34(1)(b).
Unlike IRGC conscripts, his association with the army wasn’t compelled by law. He served for over three decades, from 1982 to 2016, and on the facts, it doesn’t appear he even disputed that he was a member.
I would argue the cases of IRGC conscripts are far more compelling: their service was compulsory, limited in duration, and in my view falls well short of membership. Still, Nahayo is helpful. It gives us a parallel of someone who served in a state’s armed forces and, consistent with how we have disputed membership for IRGC conscripts, confirms that membership and inadmissibility in that context must be interpreted through a post-Mason lens.
1. Membership requires a nexus to the security of Canada
As we’ve been arguing for the past two years and in all of our litigation concerning IRGC conscripts, membership under s. 34(1)(f), read in light of Mason, requires a nexus to the security of Canada. Nahayo follows an extensive line of jurisprudence confirming the same.
Riding on the back of the Federal Court of Appeal’s decision in Wahab (2026 FCA 140), Nahayo directly puts to rest the position that Mason shouldn’t apply to all of s. 34. Justice Lafrenière, likely addressing some of the positions taken by the Minister, states it explicitly:
“[16] In light of the reasoning in Wahab FCA, it is now clear that adjudicators are definitively required to use the principle of non-refoulement as a guide at the admissibility stage when interpreting the law.”
This is rather important because the Minister has been actively trying to dispute this central finding from Mason.
In fact, in our recent IRGC conscript cases, at admissibility hearings and before the Federal Court, the Minister has taken the position that Mason was limited to s. 34(1)(e), arguing that non-refoulement falls outside the scope of the admissibility assessment. Interestingly, nearly every post-Mason decision has contradicted the Minister’s position, but so far they’ve held firm, attempting to explain these decisions away — clearly unsuccessfully.
After Wahab, and now Nahayo, it will be interesting to see whether the Minister keeps advancing such arguments.
2. Still no framework for assessing membership
Lastly, and once again, the Court in Nahayo passed on the opportunity to opine on a permissible approach to membership. Specifically, the Court declined to set out a test or clear framework for assessing membership in a way that complies with Canada’s international obligations and the principle of non-refoulement.
Over the next few months, it will be worth watching how tribunals build a Mason-compliant approach to membership, and what the courts have to say about those approaches.
Where this leaves IRGC conscripts
What strikes me most about Nahayo is how candid the Court is about the shift. Justice Lafrenière notes the IAD couldn’t be faulted for applying the broad approach to membership. For years, that broad approach, endorsed by the Federal Court of Appeal in Najafi, simply was the law. That’s no longer the end of the analysis. Every decision-maker assessing membership under s. 34(1)(f) now has to grapple with non-refoulement, and a decision that doesn’t will not survive review.
What the Court didn’t do is tell us what membership looks like after Mason. It left that to the parties to argue and the tribunal to decide. That means the real work is now happening at admissibility hearings and before the IAD. For IRGC conscripts, I think that’s where these cases will ultimately be won: in building a record and an approach to membership that actually reflects who these individuals are and what their service involved.
More on that, and on where the IRGC cases started and where they’re heading, in my next post.
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General information, not legal advice. Every case is different.